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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
BRENT MAUCHLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
-
Case No. 20010551 -SC 
Priority 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case is before this Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has questioned the soundness of the corpus delicti rule since 1957. 
Should Utah now join the growing number of jurisdictions that have abandoned the 
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, 
giving no deference to its conclusions of law. State v. A.T., 2001 UT 82, <I 5, 34 P.3d 
228. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involvps interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(1) 
(1999), which states: 
(1) A person commits a fraudulent insurance act if that person with intent 
to defraud: 
(a) presents or causes to be presented any oral or written statement or 
representation knowing that the statement or representation contains 
false or fraudulent information concerning any fact material to an 
application for the issuance or renewal of an insurance policy, 
certificate, or contract; 
part 
(b) presents, or causes 
or representation as 
other benefit pursuant 
or in connection with 
damages for personal 
that the statement or 
information concerning 
fo be presented, any oral or written statement 
of or in support of a claim for payment or 
an insurance policy, certificate, or contract, 
civil claim asserted for recovery of 
bodily injuries or property damage, knowing 
representation contains false or fraudulent 
any fact or thing material to the claim; 
to 
any 
or 
(c) knowingly accepts & benefit from proceeds derived from a 
fraudulent insurance act; 
(d) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devises a scheme or 
artifice to obtain fees for professional services, or anything of value 
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, 
or material omissions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Ifiial Court Proceedings 
The State charged defendant gnd his wife with insurance fraud and theft by 
deception, both second degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-521 and 
76-6-405 (1999). R. 2-3. Defendant moved to dismiss on the grounds that the only 
evidence of his guilt was his confessiion, but it was inadmissible because the State could 
not satisfy the corpus delicti rule. R. 33-39. The trial court denied the motion. R. 98-99, 
116: 9-10. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge of attempted 
insurance fraud, and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion. R. 85, 89-96. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five 
years, but it suspended the prison sentence, placed defendant on probation for three years, 
and ordered that he serve sixty days in the Salt Lake County Jail or perform 300 hours of 
community service. R. 117: 5-6. The trial court also ordered that defendant pay full 
restitution, a S500 fine, a surcharge, and a SI50 recoupment fee. R. 117: 6. 
The Direct Appeal 
In the court of appeals, defendant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the 
State had satisfied the corpus delicti rule. State v. Mauchley, 2001 UT App. 177, U 1, 
attached as Addendum A. The State conceded that it had not satisfied the corpus delicti 
rule. See id., Add A. Nevertheless, it argued that Utah should join the federal courts and 
the growing number of state courts that have abandoned the corpus delicti rule in favor of 
a trustworthiness approach to determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession. 
See Brief of Appellee, filed in the court of appeals, case no. 20000682-CA. The State 
argued that the trial court's order should be affirmed on the alternative ground that the 
confession was trustworthy, and therefore admissible. Id. 
The State recognized that this Court, rather than the court of appeals, should 
decide the issue. Accordingly, the State filed a suggestion for certification of the case to 
this Court. See Manchley, 2001 UT App. 177 at 1| 2, Add A. The court of appeals 
3 
declined to certify the appeal and reversed tne trial court, based on the State's concession 
that it had not satisfied the corpus ddlicti rule. Id at «|3, Add A. 
Certiorari Review Granted 
The State petitioned this Coup to issue a wnt of certiorari and review whether 
Utah should adopt the trustworthiness standard. See Petition for Wnt of Certiorari. This 
Court issued the writ. 
STAlEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant's motion to dismisls was submitted on the following stipulated facts: 
On the night of January 5, 1995, the Defendant and his wife, 
Kathleen Bolton, checked into the ER at the FHP Hospital in South Salt 
Lake claiming to have fallen nto [a] hole caused by an uncovered water 
meter in the street outside FHP. An off duty police officer working secunty 
for FHP was shown the hole ind bamcaded it until it could be filled in. It 
was later determined during an independent investigation by the relevant 
insurance company that a conlstruction truck may have run over the meter 
breaking the manhole cover. 
hils Both Defendant and 
claimed injuries. The insurance 
who apparently insures South 
regarding the amount of damage 
manhole, the insurance company 
release of all claims in the amount 
was never any question that 
during the investigation and 
wife received medical attention for their 
claim was made to Reliance Insurance Co. 
Salt Lake City. After civil litigation 
es and who was at fault for the open 
settled with Defendant and his wife for 
of $50,000 on August 17, 1998. There 
Oefendant and his wife had fallen in the hole 
gation m this case. 
On February 9, 1999, 
police department and told Dkectiv 
the open manhole and had fabricated 
obtain money for the fabncated 
charged with Insurance Fraua 
lti 
|he Defendant went to the South Salt Lake 
e Smartt that he and his wife had seen 
the story of falling in so they could 
accident. Defendant and his wife were then 
in this case. 
R 37-38. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGIMENT 
This Court has questioned the validity of the common law corpus delicti rule for 
nearly half a century The time has come to abandon the corpus delicti rule and join the 
growing number jurisdictions that have adopted the trustworthiness standard for 
determining whether a defendant's out-of-court statements can be used against him 
Jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus delicti rule because it is unsound For 
example, the rule fails to serve its own purposes, its numerous exceptions further 
undermine its rationale, and it obstructs justice by hindering and even preventing 
discovery of truth Jurisdictions have adopted the trustworthiness standard because it 
better protects defendants and increases the factfinder's ability to ascertain truth. 
In this case the State produced substantial independent evidence establishing the 
trustworthiness of defendant's confession. Therefore, defendant's confession was 
admissible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH SHOULD JOIN THE GROWING NUMBER OF 
JURISDICTIONS THAT HAVE ADOPTED THE 
TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD. 
Although defendant voluntarily confessed his guilt, the court of appeals reversed 
his conviction on the basis of the corpus delicti rule In Utah, the corpus delicti rule is a 
judicially created rule requiring that before a defendant's inculpatory statements can be 
introduced against him, the State must prove, by evidence independent of the defendant's 
statements, that a crime occurred. State v Johnson, 821 P 2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) 
5 
The independent evidence must cleatly and convincingly show: "(i) "[t]hat a wrong, an 
injury, or a damage has been done/ &nd (ii) 'that such was effected by a criminal agency, 
i.e., without right or by unlawful me^ns.'" Id. at 1162, 1163 (quoting State v. Johnson, 83 
P.2d 1010, 1014 (Utah 1938) (alteration in original)).1 
Nearly half a century ago this Court acknowledged the unsoundness of the corpus 
delicti rule. See State v. Weldon,3\q P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). Speaking of the rule, 
this Court noted that "[notwithstanding its universality, eminent authorities have gravely 
doubted its validity." Id. 
Over ten years ago this Court (recognized the trustworthiness standard as an 
alternative to the corpus delicti rule. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1163 n.9. However, this 
Court reserved the opportunity to consider the trustworthiness standard because the 
evidence in Johnson was sufficient upder the old rule. Id. 
The opportunity lacking in Johnson presents itself in this case because the State 
concedes that the independent evidence did not establish the corpus delicti of insurance 
i The term "corpus delicti" is also generally used to describe the sum of the 
elements that must be proven in order to convict. See Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77 
n.9 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); Frederick v. State, 37 P.3d 908, 931 n.8 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2001). In this general sense, the State must always prove the "corpus delicti" to obtain a 
conviction. 
This general use of the term should not be confused, however, with the more 
specific "corpus delicti rule," which governs the admissibility of a defendant's out-of-
court statements. See Johnson, 821 IP.2d at 1162, 1163. Therefore, the issue before the 
Court is not whether the State must drove the "corpus delicti," in the general sense, to 
obtain a conviction. Rather, the issue is whether the State should no longer be required to 
satisfy the "corpus delicti rule" befoije a defendant's out-of-court statements can be used 
to establish his Ruilt. 
6 
fraud. See Mauchle\\ 2001 LT App. 177, <[ 1, Add. A. For the reasons explained below, 
this Court should abandon the common law corpus delicti rule and adopt the 
trustworthiness standard. 
A. A growing number of jurisdictions have abandoned the corpus 
delicti rule. 
The federal courts and a growing number of state courts have abandoned the 
corpus delicti rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. The United States Supreme 
Court did so in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 91-94 (1954). See United States v. 
Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999) {"Opper rejected a view which had earlier 
been the rule in many jurisdictions and was deeply rooted in the common law that 
independent evidence was required to corroborate the corpus delicti/'). The Opper Court 
discussed the divergence among the circuit courts of appeal in applying the traditional 
corpus delicti rule and then concluded, "we think the better rule to be that the 
corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish 
the corpus delicti." 348 U.S. at 93. The Court then announced the trustworthiness 
standard: "[i]t is necessary, therefore, to require the Government to introduce substantial 
independent evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." 
Id. The Court clarified that "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential 
facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." Id. In the companion 
case of Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156 (1954), the Court further explained that 
"[a]ll elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence or 
corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the independent 
7 
evidence to bolster the confession itseir and therebv pro\e the offense 'through' the 
statements of the accused." 
Following Opper, the federallcourts quickly adopted the trustworthiness standard. 
The Tenth Circuit, for example, rejected the corpus delicti rule in Brasuell v United 
States, 224, F.2d 706, 711 (10th Cir. 1955). In 1988 the Seventh Circuit declared that "the 
corpus delicti rule no longer exists ih the federal system, where the requirement is instead 
that there must be substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish the 
trustworthiness of the statement." United States v Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 940 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
A growing number of states have followed suit. By 1978 at least five states had 
discarded the corpus delicti rule in flavor of Opper's trustworthiness approach. See Julian 
S. Millstein, Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for the Corpus 
Delicti Rule, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1219 n.83 (1978). By 1993, at least ten states 
embraced the trustworthiness approach. See Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason * 
Requiring Independent ProofofthelCorpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an 
Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F.|L. REV. 385, 413 (1993). 
Currently, at least twelve states, plus the District of Columbia, have completely 
abandoned the corpus delicti rule in| favor of a trustworthiness approach.2 See State \ 
2
 In addition, a California atipellate court applied the trustworthiness standard in 
People v Cuevas, 280 P 2d 831,833 (Cal Dist Ct. App 1955); however, the corpus 
delicti rule remains the law in California. See People v Ochoa, 966 P 2d 442, 472 (Cal 
1998). 
8 
Hafford. 746 A.2d 150, 173-74 (Conn. 2000) (adopting the trustworthiness standard for 
all crimes); Adams v. United States, 502 A.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C. 1986) ("the adequacy of 
corroborating proof is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus delicti but by 
the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.") (quoting United 
States v. Johnson, 589 F.2d 716, 718-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978)); Reynolds v. State, 309 S.E.2d 
867, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) ("corroboration in any material particular satisfies the 
requirements of the law."); State v. Yoshida, 354 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Haw. 1960) ("we find 
sound the reasoning of and align with the authorities which support the rule that does not 
require full proof of the corpus delicti to be established independently of the confession 
before it may be resorted to."); People v. Brechon, 390 N.E.2d 626, 629 (111. Ct. App. 
1979) ("Independent evidence does not have to corroborate the proof as to any particular 
element of the crime charged but only establish a tendency to inspire belief in the truth of 
the accused's confession or admission."); In r^: Welfare ofM.D.S., 345 N.W.2d 723, 735 
(Minn. 1984) ("not all or any of the elements [of the crime] had to be individually 
corroborated but could be 'sufficiently substantiated by independent evidence of 
attending facts or circumstances from which the jury may infer the trustworthiness of the 
confession.'") (quoting Smoot v. United States, 312 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1962)); State v. 
Zysk, 465 A.2d 480, 483 (N.H. 1983) ("Proof of the cnme by evidence independent of the 
confession is not necessary. There need only be sufficient corroboration to indicate that 
the confession is trustworthy."); State v. Paris, 414 P.2d 512, 515 (N.M. 1966) 
("corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to 
9 
establish the corpus delicti, but. . . the Government must introduce substantial 
independent evidence which would tfend to establish the trustworthiness of the 
statement."); State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d 487, 495 (N.C. 1985) (holding that in all but 
capital cases, "it is no longer necessary that there be independent proof tending to 
establish the corpus delicti of the crirtie charged if the accused's confession is supported 
by substantial independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness."); Fontenot 
v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 77-78 (Okla. C i^m. App. 1994) ("we now reject the corpus delicti 
line of analysis and reaffirm this Coulrt's pnor adoption of the standard which requires 
only that a confession be supported by 'substantial independent evidence which would 
tend to establish its trustworthiness."') (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 
(1954)); State v. Osborne, 516 S.E.24 201, 204-05 (S.C. 1999) ("the corroboration rule is 
satisfied if the State provides sufficient independent evidence which serves to corroborate 
the defendant's extra-judicial statements and, together with such statements, permits a 
reasonable belief that the crime occurred."); Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1999) (noting that under Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 
"oral statements . . . are admissible ifl at the time they were made they contained assertions 
unknown by law enforcement but lat^r corroborated."); Holt v. State, 117 N.W.2d 626, 
632-33 (Wis. 1962) (holding that corroboration of any significant fact is sufficient to 
allow conviction based on confession). 
Four additional states have erribraced the trustworthiness standard, but have 
ambiguously applied it by also discussing the traditional corpus delicti standard. See 
10 
Jacinth v. State, 593 P.2d 263, 265-66 (Alaska 1979) (applying both the trustworthiness 
and corpus delicti standards); State v. True* 316 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Neb. 1982) (holding 
that only slightly corroborated confession is sufficient to establish guilt, but also 
discussing traditional corpus delicti requirements); State v. Lucas, 152 A.2d 50, 60-61 
(N.J. 1959) (holding that evidence independent of the confession must tend to establish is 
trustworthiness and prove loss or injury); State v. Ervin, 731 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tenn. Cnm. 
App. 1986) (applying both the trustworthiness and corpus delicti standards). 
In at least three states, supreme court justices have written well-reasoned 
dissenting or concurring opinions urging rejection of the corpus delicti rule and adoption 
of the trustworthiness standard. See Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441, 445-46 (Fla. 1993) 
(Shaw, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus delicti rule "is an anachronism," and "a 
technicality that impedes rather than fosters the search for truth."); People v. McMahan, 
548 N.W.2d 199, 203-09 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting) (stating that the corpus 
delicti rule "promises too much, while it delivers too little."); State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 
907-11 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis should not stand in the 
way of enhancing the truthfinding purpose of criminal trials."). 
Even states that retain the corpus delicti rule have recognized the rule's extensive 
criticism. State v. Curlew, 459 A.2d 160, 164 (Me. 1983) ("Commentators have decried 
the confusion [surrounding application of the corpus delicti rule]."); State v. Hansen. 989 
P.2d 338, 346 (Mont. 1999) ("Eventually, the corpus delicti rule outlived its usefulness 
and the rule was thoroughly disparaged by commentators."); Sheriff, Washoe County v 
11 
Dhadda, 980 P.2d 1062, 1065 n.l (Nev. 1999) ("Commentators have generally agreed 
that the corpus delicti rule is no longer needed . . . ."); State v. Ralston, 425 N.E.2d 916, 
919 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) ("Other jurisdictions and text writers assert that the purpose o( 
the corpus delicti rule is met if the state produces independent evidence showing the 
trustworthiness of the confession/'); \State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 222 (Wash. 1996) ('The 
who criticize the rule are not without 
corpus delicti rule has been criticized by courts and legal commentators."). 
This Court has also acknowledged the questionable policies behind the corpus 
delicti rule. See State v. Weldon,2>\A P.2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957). In Weldon this Court 
noted that "[notwithstanding its universality, eminent authorities have gravely doubted 
its validity." Id. at 355. Although recognizing that "[t]he arguments presented by those 
some merit/' id. at 356, this Court nevertheless 
applied the rule "in deference to the time honored and important precept of our law that it 
is better that ten guilty go free, than that one innocent be punished." Id. 
The corpus delicti rule remains the law in Utah. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 
1150, 1162-63 (Utah 1991); Sate v. DeHart, 2001 Ut App. 12, 17 P.3d 1171. 
Nevertheless, this Court has included language in some opinions acknowledging the trend 
toward the trustworthiness approach 
1015 (Utah 1938), overruled in part 
For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 
and on other grounds by State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 
we think the only safe general rule id 
178, 188 (Utah 1943), this Court stated, "[cjonfessions are necessarily weak or strong 
evidence according to the circumstances attending the making and proving of them; and 
to require some other evidence corroborative of 
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their truth ' This Court further explained that "such corroborative evidence mu t^ con i^bt 
of facts or circumstances appeanng in evidence independent of the confession and 
consistent therewith, tending to confirm and strengthen the confession." Id at 1016 
In Weldon, this Court went so far as to declare that, "the generally accepted view, 
to which we give our approval, is that the evidence independent of the confession need 
not establish the corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof" 314 P 2d at 356 
(emphasis added) The court further explained that, "the whole evidence, including the 
confession, may be considered together in determining whether the corpus delicti has 
been satisfactorily established/' Id 
Finally, in Johnson, this Court acknowledged the opportunity to address the 
trustworthiness standard. See 821 P 2d at 1163 n.9. It reserved this opportunity for a 
later case, however, finding that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the traditional 
corpus delicti rule. See Id, The time has come for Utah to adopt the trustworthiness 
approach. 
B. Stare decisis does not justify retaining the corpus delicti rule. 
This Court "is not inexorably bound by its own precedents." See State v Xlenzies, 
889 P 2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the automatic reversal rule of Crawford \ 
Manning, 542 P 2d 1091(Utah 1975) Rather, this Court "will follow the rule of law 
which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was 
onginally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more 
good than harm will come by departing from precedent " Id \s will be demonstrated 
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below, the corpus delicti rule is no longer sound because (1) it poorly serves it own 
purposes, (2) its numerous exceptions further undermine its rationale, and (3) it obstructs 
justice by hindenng and even preventing discovery of truth Abandoning the rule in favor 
of the trustworthiness standard will produce more good than harm, see Menzies, 889 P 2d 
at 399, because it better protects a aeiendant's rights, while increasing the factfinder's 
ability to ascertain truth. 
1. The corpus delicti rule is unsound because it poorly serves 
its own purposes. 
The corpus delicti rule developed in England in response to the very specific 
problem of supposed murder victims "reappearing" after their "murderer V execution 
See Mullen, 27 U S.F L. REV at 390-401. Perry's Case, for example, is often cited as a 
"galvanizing force" in the development of the corpus delicti rule Id In that case a 
suspect confessed to murder and implicated his mother and brother as well. Id After all 
three were executed, the supposed victim appeared and recounted a bizarre story about 
being sold into slavery in Turkey. /J/. 
Whatever its origins, "[i]t is unclear whether the corpus delicti rule ever became 
part of English common law." Id at 400-401 If it did, "it was an ill-defined feature of 
the law related to homicide and was rarely, if ever, extended to other crimes " Id See 
also, 7 John H Wigmore, Evidence,^ § 2072, at 524 (revised by James H Chadbourn 
1978) (noting that the English rule was limited to homicide cases) As Wigmore 
observed, "[t]he policy of any rule 0t the sort is questionable " § 2070, p 510 
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In \menca, the rule remains a creature of the common law, "no court has ever 
held that the rule is constitutionally grounded " Mullen, 27 U S F L REV at 387, 
XlcCormick on Evidence, § 145 at 521 (John W Strong ed , 5h ed 1999) American 
jurisdictions, however, have expanded the rule beyond its narrow English origins and 
applied it to all types of cnmes. See State v Weldon^U P 2d 353, 355 (Utah 1957) ("In 
this country, the corpus delicti rule is applied to all cnmes") 
Modern courts and commentators generally justify the corpus delicti rule as 
serving three purposes: first, protecting the mentally unstable who falsely confess, 
second, avoiding reliance on repudiated confessions out of concern for voluntanness, and 
third, promoting better law enforcement by reducing reliance on confessions. Mullen, 27 
U S F. L REV at 401. "In every case," however, "the rationale proves too much while 
the corpus delicti rule delivers too little." Id 
First, the rule does little to protect defendants who are mentally unstable and 
falsely confess. Because the rule only applies to out-of-court statements, see Weldon, 314 
P 2d at 354, it offers no protection to the determined lunatic who confesses to an 
imaginary cnme and proceeds to plead guilty See Mullen 27 U S F L. REV at 402-03 
Nor does the rule protect the person who falsely confesses to an actual cnme, because it 
requires only proof that a cnme was committed by someone Id 
Second, the idea that the corpus delicti rule avoids reliance on involuntary 
confessions is fallacious Ironically, the corpus delicti rule allows the use of a dubious 
confession if the prosecution can produce independent evidence of a cnme, yet 
15 
completely bars the use of a conced^dly voluntary confession if there is no evidence ot 
the crime other than the confession. Id. at 405. 
Furthermore, modern constitutional and statutory protections surpass the rule's 
utility as a means of protecting the rfientally unstable, or avoiding reliance on 
involuntarily confessions. See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Mich. 1996) 
(Boyle, J., dissenting). For example^ a confession obtained by knowing exploitation of a 
defendant's insanity violates due process and is inadmissible, even if other evidence 
corroborates the confession or establishes guilt. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 
206-07 (1960). Likewise, the totality of the circumstances, including government 
coercion and, where applicable, a defendant's mental disabilities and deficiencies, may 
render a confession involuntary and I there fore inadmissible. State v. Rettenberger, 1999 
UT 80, ffl[ 15, 45, 984 P.2d 1009. When a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his 
statement, the State bears the burden of demonstrating voluntariness. Id. at f 45 (quoting 
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 300 (Ufah 1992)). 
Additionally, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), assures that all defendants 
are advised of their right to remain Silent and their right to the presence of counsel dunng 
a custodial interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has also established a bright-
line rule forbidding the police from initiating an interrogation following a defendant's 
exercise of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484 (1981); Michigan v. Jackson, 4f5 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). 
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A cnminal detendant also has a statutory right to petition for an evaluation ot hir> 
mental competency at any stage of a cnminal proceeding See UTAH CODE ANN ^ 77-15-
3(1) (1999) A tnal court may also raise the issue of a defendant's mental competency at 
any time Id at § 77-15-4 The above-cited precedents and statutes provide a formidable 
bulwark of modern protections designed to protect a cnminal defendant from involuntary 
self-mcnmination Thus, any "suggestion that the corpus delicti rule meaningfully 
buttresses the nght against coerced self-incnmination is anachronistic at best ' Mullen, 
27 U S F L REV at 405. 
Finally, contemporary junsprudence has also undermined the rationale that the 
corpus delicti rule promotes better law enforcement 'The notion that law enforcement 
can be made better by bamng confessions ignores the fact that voluntary confessions are 
sometimes the product of good law enforcement." Id at 406. When the police skillfully 
obtain a confession from a suspect in full compliance with the constitutional protections 
outlined above, it does not promote good law enforcement to bar admission of the 
confession on the grounds of the corpus delicti rule Id "Indeed ," as both this Court 
and the United States Supreme Court have recognized, "admissions of guilt by 
wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable " State v Piansiaksone, 954 P 2d 
861, 865 (Utah 1998) (quoting Oregon v Elstad. 470 U S 298, 305 (1985)) 
The law enforcement improvement rationale also fails to explain the limits ot the 
rule Mullen, 27 U S F L. REV at 406 If the rule is designed to force the police to ^oKe 
a cnme unassisted by the suspect, then the rule should not allow the police to rely on the 
17 
suspect's confession to establish thet most important part of their case: "'that the accused 
was the guilty agent.'" State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (quoting State 
v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah l]987) (noting that the rule does not require the State 
to show *4that the accused was the guilty agent.")). 
The corpus delicti rule, as Judge Posner observed, was "never well adapted to its 
purpose." United States v. Kerley, «38 F.2d 932, 939-40 (7th Cir 1988). A rule that fails 
to serve its own purposes is unsound and should be abandoned. 
2. The rule's numerous exceptions also demonstrate its 
infirmity. 
States that retain the corpus delicti rule have carved out numerous exceptions to 
the rule and also reduced the amount of evidence necessary to satisfy it. Mullen 27 
U.S.F. L. REV. at 407. This need t0 create exceptions and modifications further 
demonstrates the rule's infirmity. As one commentator observed, "[t]he common need to 
work around the rule to achieve justice suggests that justice would be better served by 
abandoning the rule." Id. at 417. 
For example, in Willoughby v. State, 552 N.E.2d 462, 466-67 (Ind. 1990) the 
Indiana Supreme Court observed that "[s]trict adherence to the corpus delicti rule, in light 
of its declining utility, presents gre^i difficulties in modern criminal law." Thus, the court 
created an exception to the rule allowing for the admission of confessions to multiple 
crimes, even though independent evidence only established the corpus delicti of the 
principle crime. See id. 
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Several states have realized that the rule is poorly suited for application in some 
criminal prosecutions. In Anzona, for example, the legislature has abolished the corpus 
delicti rule in automobile collision cases resulting in injury or death. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-1388(G); State v. Dougherty, 845 P.2d 474, 477 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
The Anzona Court of Appeals further narrowed the rule when it held the rule inapplicable 
to cnmes in which statements themselves are the corpus delicti, such as pandenng, 
solicitation, promotion of gambling, or offenng to sell narcotics. Id at 478. Likewise, 
the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the trustworthiness standard in a prosecution for 
conspiracy to commit murder. See Doyle v State, 921 P.2d 901, 911 (Nev. 1996). These 
states have already discovered the increasing difficulties in applying the corpus delicti 
rule to the more numerous and complex cnmes set forth in modern cnminal codes. 
McCormick on Evidence, §147 at 528 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). This is 
especially true for crimes "that may not have a tangible corpus delicti, such as attempt 
offenses, conspiracy, tax evasion and similar offenses." Id. 
Some states have relaxed the rule by not requinng proof of the corpus delicti to 
exclude all inferences of a noncriminal cause of the harm or injury. See Commonwealth 
v Williams, 417 A.2d 1200, 1020 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) ("A corpus delicti may exist even 
though the circumstances may also be consistent with innocence."); People v Ochoa* 966 
P.2d 442, 473 (Cal. 1998) (involving a rape charge). 
Several states, including Utah, have also excluded application of the rule to certain 
categones of statements. See Mullen 27 U S F L REV at 409-10. In Utah and 
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Pennsylvania, for example, the rule only applies to inculpatory statements. See State \ 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991) (explaining that the rule only limits the use of 
a defendant's inculpatory statement^); Commonwealth v. Verticelli, 706 A.2d 820, 824 
(Pa. 1998) ("Only inculpatory statements of an accused are subject to the protection of the 
corpus delicti rule."). Furthermore, Johnson also excludes application of the rule to 
statements made before or during the commission of a crime. Id. at 1162-63. Other states 
have a similar exception. See Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV. at 410-11. 
States have further limited th 
standard for the corroboration rule 
e corpus delicti rule by reducing the amount of 
evidence necessary to satisfy the rule. For example, the Vermont Supreme Court held 
that independent evidence of the corpus delicti need not prove commission of the crime 
charged by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Weller, 644 A.2d 839, 841 (Vt. 
1994) ("Slight corroboration may be sufficient.")- Likewise, in Massachusetts, "the 
. is merely that there be some evidence, besides the 
confession, that the criminal act was committed by someone, that is, that the crime was 
real and not imaginary." Commonwealth v. Costello, 582 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Mass. 1991) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
These numerous exceptions evidence the infirmity of the corpus delicti rule. As 
one commentator observed, the creation of so many exceptions to the rule has "generally 
distanced the corpus delicti rule even further from its nominal purposes. The exceptions 
consume much of the rule and the relaxed evidentiary standard so dilutes the remainder 
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that any argument for retaining the corpus delicti rule is seriously undercut/' Mullen 2" 
U S F L. REV. at 407. 
3. The rule is also unsound because it obstructs justice by 
hindering and even preventing discovery of truth. 
*'[T]he central purpose of a criminal tnal is to decide the factual question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence/' Colorado v Connelly, 479 U S. 157, 166(1986) 
(quoting Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 U S 673, 681 (1986)). The exclusion of 
evidence, even to protect constitutional guarantees, deflects a criminal tnal from this 
basic purpose. See id. The exclusion of evidence to serve an anachronistic and unsound 
common law rule, however, obstructs justice. See 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2070 at 510 
(Chadbourn rev. 1978). 
Literal application of the corpus delicti rule evidences its propensity to obstruct 
justice. For example, if a defendant is careless enough to leave behind a body or other 
corroborating evidence, the rule allows the prosecution to confront him with his 
confession. People v. McMahan, 548 N.W 2d 199, 205 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., 
dissenting). The rule bars the use of a more cunning defendant's confession, however 
Id 
In McMahan, for example, the victim left her apartment with the defendant Id at 
200. She was in bare feet, wearing a sleeveless shirt and shorts, and did not take her 
purse, her thyroid or epilepsy medication, or any identification with her. Id at 200, 209 
She promised to return home by midnight, but was never heard from again Id She was 
not discovered in any hospital or morgue, she had not recently contacted any of the 
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governmental agencies she frequented, and her sole means of support—welfare and 
Medicaid checks—went uncollected Id. at 200, 209. 
McMahan eventually gave thrpe full confessions detailing the murder. Id. He 
explained how he buried the victim iji the basement of his house, then in an alley next to 
his house, and eventually placed her pody in trashbags and threw them in a city dumpster 
Id. A tracking dog detected a humart scent inside a crawl space and in the alley, and a 
police officer testified about a hole irt the basement that had been dug out and filled in. 
Id. 202, 209. The police never recovered the murder weapon, nor did they find any 
human blood stains in the defendant is house. Id. at 202. Although the court 
acknowledged that the nearly five-yqar delay between the alleged murder and defendant's 
confession hampered the collection q>f evidence, id., it nevertheless upheld the reversal of 
McMahan's murder conviction on the grounds that the evidence did not establish the 
corpus delicti. Id. at 203. 
Justice Boyle, however, criticized the court's failure to abandon the corpus delicti 
rule in favor of the trustworthiness standard. See Id. at 209 (Boyle, J., dissenting). He 
lamented that fc6the common-law corpus delicti rule operates to shield a recanting 
defendant cunning enough to destroy a body or conceal its identity, despite a voluntary 
and reliable confession to the crime. That price is too high/' Id. 
Other examples of the unjust iresults that the rule often produces are easily 
discoverable, even in Utah. For example, in State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Utah 
1938), this Court applied the corpus delicti rule to reverse a mother's conviction for 
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murdenng her newborn child, finding that the trial court erred in admitting her multiple 
voluntary confessions. Johnson testified that in sub-zero weather on the night of 1 
February 1937, she gave birth to a baby boy, unattended, although her mother slept in the 
same room and her brother in an adjoining room. Id at 1012 She was unconscious for 
an hour or more after giving birth, but when she regained consciousness she discovered 
the baby in the bed covered in the vernix caseosa, and with part of the placenta attached 
Id She discovered that the baby was not breathing, nor was its heart beating Id She 
left the baby under the covers until the next evening when she earned it to a park and left 
it in a public toilet. Id. 
Johnson told her doctor and the police a different story. Id. A few days after the 
baby was discovered, Johnson went to her doctor hoping that an examination would prove 
that she had not recently given birth. Id. The examination prove the opposite, and the 
doctor asked Johnson whether the baby found in the toilet was hers. Id. Johnson 
confessed that she already had enough children, could not raise another, and even 
demonstrated to the doctor how she had put her hand over the baby's nose and mouth to 
suffocate it. /rf. at 1012-13. A few days later she again told the doctor that she had 
suffocated the baby, and explained that she pushed it down under the bed clothes and 
covered it up when she was sure that it was dead Id Johnson also confessed to the 
deputy sheriff that she killed the baby. Id 
This Court upheld the tnal court's findings that Johnson's confessions were 
voluntary Id at 1013-14 Nevertheless, this Court determined that the confessions were 
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erroneously admitted because there was no proof of the corpus delicti. Id. at 1014-18. 
This Court cited the absence of martys of violence on the infant or any external signs of 
suffocation, and the doctor's testimolny that the infant died of asphyxiation. Id. at 1016. 
In a similar case, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a babysitter's 
manslaughter conviction, finding insufficient independent evidence of the corpus delicti. 
State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 225 (W^sh. 1996). An autopsy revealed that the infant victim 
died of either Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) or acute respiratory failure. Id. at 
214. A pathologist testified that it was possible that manual interference or suffocation 
could begin the process of respiratoiiy failure in an infant but that the interference or 
suffocation was not necessarily detectable in an autopsy. Id. The pathologist was unable 
to determine whether the death might have been caused by manual interference or SIDS. 
Id. 
In the days after the infant's death, the babysitter—Aten—put some of her 
possessions in storage, asked people to temporarily keep other possessions, and gave 
some of them away. Id. at 214. Sh^ told her daughter that she was doing this because 
"the sheriff might lock the whole house up." Id. When the baby's mother told Aten mat 
the autopsy report showed the baby died of SIDS, Aten told her the report was not true. 
Id. 
Aten later confessed to the baby's mother that she had killed the baby by 
smothering her with a pillow becau$e the baby had cried all night. Id. at 215. In a 
separate statement to the police sheiexplained that she put her hand over the baby's mouth 
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and nose until the baby calmed down, but that the baby was still fussing when she put the 
baby back in bed. Id. at 216-17. Although the court found that Aten's waiver of rights 
and confession were voluntary, it nevertheless held that the evidence was insufficient to 
sustain her conviction under the corpus delicti rule. Id. at 224-25.3 
The corpus delicti rule also hinders prosecutions of child sexual abuse. For 
example, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a conviction for first-degree child 
molestation because facts independent of the defendant's confession did not establish the 
corpus delicti. See State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904, 907 (Wash. 1996). Ray and his wife were 
sleeping in their bedroom when their three-year-old daughter came into the room asking 
for a glass of water. Id. at 904. Ray, who normally slept nude, left the room with his 
daughter to get the water. Id. He later returned to the bedroom upset and crying, awoke 
his wife, and had a discussion with her. Id. His wife immediately became upset and ran 
to check on her daughter, who by this time had fallen asleep. Id. Ray's wife returned to 
the bedroom and, after further discussion, Ray placed a call to his sexual deviancy 
therapist. Id. at 904-05. 
Ray confessed to the police that he gave his daughter a glass of water and took her 
back to her bedroom. Id. at 905. When she got into bed he took her hand and placed it on 
his penis. Id. After a few seconds the daughter pulled away and Ray returned to his 
3
 One commentator has aptly described the hazards of applying the corpus delicti 
rule in cases involving SIDS. See Catherine L. Goldenberg, Comment, Sudden Infant 
Death Syndrome as a Mask for Murder: Investigating and Prosecuting Infanticide, 28 
Sw. U. L. REV. 599, 612-17 (1999). 
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bedroom where he admitted the act t<f> his wife. Id Ray stipulated to the facts in the 
police report and waived his right to trial. Id Nevertheless, the court applied the corpus 
delicti rule and reversed his conviction, feeling ''bound to follow our previous rulings on 
the issue." Id. 
The court did so over Justice Talmadge's well-reasoned dissent, in which he 
stated, "[t]he rule of corpus delicti his become a serious impediment to the proper 
handling of certain kinds of cases, particularly those involving highly vulnerable or 
youthful victims of crime who cannot give voice to the fact of the crime against them." 
Id. at 910 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) Justice Talmadge continued, "In cases such as the 
one before us, infanticide or child abuse by suffocation, where independent evidence of 
the cnme may be virtually unattainable, it is contrary to the interests of justice to permit 
Itner of fact from considenng a confession." Id.x the corpus delicti rule to prevent the 
The above cases illustrate the 
386. As Justice Talmadge reasoned 
propensity of the corpus delicti rule to "prevent[] 
finding the truth." Id. at 910-11. Tlje corpus delicti rule extracts a high pnce "m the form 
of reversed convictions of guilty persons, [and] prosecutions abandoned or never begun 
for want of independent evidence of the corpus delicti. . . ." Mullen 27 U.S.F. L. REV at 
"[sjtare decisis should not stand in the way of 
enhancing the truthfinding purpose <t>f criminal trials." Ray, 926 P.2d at 911. 
4
 Another case that demonstrates 
child sexual abuse cases is Commonwealth 
(reversing convictions for rape of a 
despite the defendant's voluntary cqn 
how the corpus delicti rule can frustrate justice in 
v Costello, 582 N.E 2d 938, 942 (Mass 1991) 
hild and indecent assault and battery on a child 
fessions). 
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4. The trustworthiness approach is superior because it better 
protects a defendant's rights while increasing the 
factfinder's ability to ascertain truth. 
Under the trustworthiness approach, a defendant's out-of-court statement can be 
used against him if the State *'introduce[s] substantial independent evidence which would 
tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement/' Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. w,It is 
sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a 
jury inference of their truth." Id. Once the State has proven the that the out-of-court 
statement is trustworthy, then that statement can be used, together with the evidence 
independent of the out-of-court statement, to prove the essential elements of the crime. 
Id. As the Court explained in Smith, "all elements of the offense must be established by 
independent evidence or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of 
corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby 
prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused." 348 U.S. at 156. 
As Justice Boyle observed in his dissent, the trustworthiness approach more 
directly protects the confessing defendant than does the corpus delicti rule. See People v. 
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., dissenting). The corpus delicti 
rule insures only that a crime has been committed by someone. Id. The trustworthiness 
approach, however, insures that a particular statement is sufficiently reliable for the 
factfinder to hear it. Id. Furthermore, the trustworthiness approach applies to any of a 
defendant's out-of-court statements, not just inculpatory statements. Compare Opper, 
348 U.S. at 91-92 (applying the trustworthiness standard to any out-of-court statement), 
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with Johnson* 821 P.2d at 1162 (appfving the corpus delicti rule e\clusi\ely to 
inculpatory statements). 
The trustworthiness approach, like the corpus delicti rule, protects a defendant who 
"confesses" to a cnme that has not been committed. Without the commission of an actual 
cnme it would be difficult to discover significant evidence establishing the 
trustworthiness of the defendant's confession to the imaginary cnme. The trustworthiness 
approach is superior to the corpus delicti rule, however, because it also protects a 
defendant who falsely confesses to an actual cnme that someone else has committed. 
McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 (Bo^le, J., dissenting). "Where there is an indication of 
unreliability, 'the trial judge . . . should exercise great care in determining whether the 
statements of the accused were corroborated.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Calderon, 
348 U.S. 160, 164 (1954). As Justice Boyle observed, the trustworthiness approach 
protects a defendant from "a dishonjest police officer, a self-interested accomplice, or a 
malicious enemy [who] seeks to 
the defendant confessed to 
delicti rule, however, lacks similar 
frame an innocent defendant by fabricating a story that 
committ|ing an actual cnme." Id. at 207 n.l 1. The corpus 
protections. 
The trustworthiness approach is also supenor to the rule when applied to cnmes 
without a tangible injury or loss, such as attempt offenses, conspiracy, or tax evasion. In 
these types of cases it cannot be shown that a cnme was committed without identifying 
the accused. McMahan, 548 N.W 2d at 207 (Boyle, J, dissenting). Therefore, the corpus 
delicti rule requires the State to als|o product evidence of the offender's identity, thereb\ 
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providing more protection to an accused in these cases "than the rule affords to a 
defendant in a homicide prosecution . . . ." Id.: see also, Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 
147, 154 (1954). The trustworthiness approach avoids this absurd result. 
The trustworthiness approach is also easier to apply than the corpus delicti rule. 
As modern statutory criminal law has increased the number and complexity of crimes, 
%
'[s]imply identifying the elements of the corpus delicti . . . provides fertile ground for 
dispute/' McCormick, § 147 at 528. Once the elements of the corpus delicti are defined, 
a court must then examine whether the independent evidence satisfies those elements, 
keeping in mind the numerous exceptions to the rule. Id. On the other hand, the 
trustworthiness approach simply examines whether there is substantial independent 
evidence to corroborate or establish the truthfulness of the defendant's statement. See 
0/?/?er,348U.S.at93. 
The trustworthiness approach also increases the factfinder's ability to discover the 
truth. In cases without a tangible loss or injury, or where actual loss is shown but 
evidence of criminal agency is lacking, the trustworthiness approach allows the factfinder 
to hear a validly obtained and voluntary confession, whereas the corpus delicti rule bars 
such evidence. See Ray, 926 P.2d at 910-11. As McCormick concluded, if a 
corroboration requirement is to be retained, "[t]he Supreme Court's [trustworthiness] 
approach," rather than the corpus delicti rule, "is best designed to pursue the realistic 
objectives of a corroboration requirement/' McCormick, § 145 at 524. 
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Just two and a half years after) 
rule should not be "applied to create 
Opper, this Court recognized that the corpus delicti 
a device for protecting defendants who reek with 
guilt:' State v. Weldon, 314 P.2d 35B, 355 (Utah 1957). u[T]he rule should be applied 
with caution and not permitted to be used as a technical obstruction to the administration 
of justice/' Id. at 376. This Court further cautioned, "[l]egal doctrines, while appropnate 
in one setting, may become a deterrent to justice when overxtended [sic]/' Id. (quoting 
Note, The Corpus Delicti-Confessiqn Problem, 43 Journal of Criminal Law 214 (1952)). 
This Court "will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, 
unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound 
because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994) (overruling the 
automatic reversal rule of Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975)). Like the 
rule overturned in Menzies, the corpus delicti rule "does not work very well." Id. at 400. 
While the rule may have had some utility when this Court decided Weldon, the rule was 
unsound from its inception and the growing complexity of the modern criminal code has 
only reinforced that conclusion.5 Subsequent constitutional and statutory protections have 
surpassed the rule, rendering it an anachronism. To paraphrase Menzies, "candor in the 
law would be better served by abandoning [the corpus delicti rule] rather than straining 
against its requirements]" by fashiloning broad exceptions. Id. Unlike Judge Learned 
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 The modern criminal code 
[973. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-102 
abolishing all common law crimes became effective 1 Julv 
and 76-1-105 (1999). 
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Hand, this Court should not feel constrained by stare decisis to follow the common law 
corpus delicti rule, all the while doubting that the rule "has in fact any substantial 
necessity injustice. . . ." Daeche v United States, 250 F. 566, 571 (2nd Cir. 1918). The 
common law corpus delicti rule is no longer sound and the trustworthiness approach is 
superior; this Court should therefore adopt the trustworthiness standard. 
II. IF THIS COURT ADOPTS THE TRUSTWORTHINESS 
STANDARD IT SHOULD REVERSE THE COURT OF 
APPEALS' DECISION AND AFFIRM DEFENDANTS 
CONVICTION BECAUSE HIS CONFESSION WAS 
TRUSTWORTHY 
Defendant's confession was trustworthy. As discussed above, the trustworthiness 
standard allows the factfinder to consider a defendant's out-of-court statement if the 
prosecution "introduce^] substantial independent evidence which would tend to establish 
the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. This evidence need not be 
sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. Id. Rather, "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration 
supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." 
Id. Defendant's confession was admissible under this standard. 
Defendant confessed that: the alleged accident occurred in South Salt Lake; it 
involved both him and his wife; they saw an uncovered manhole; they decided to 
fabncate a story about falling into the hole; they did so in order to obtain money; and thev 
in fact obtained money by fraud. R. at 37-38. 
Substantial independent evidence tended to establish the trustworthiness of 
defendant's confession. See Opper, 348 U S at 93 The evidence established that both 
31 
defendant and his wife sought treatment for injuries allegedly suffered outside the FHP 
hospital in South Salt Lake; both reported that they were injured when they fell into an 
uncovered manhole outside the hospital; a security officer discovered an uncovered 
manhole near the hospital; both defendant and his wife filed an insurance claim based on 
the alleged accident; and both received a $50,000 insurance settlement. R. at 37-38. The 
independent evidence also established that defendant's confession was voluntary. Id. 
Therefore, defendant's confession was admissible as evidence of his guilt under the 
trustworthiness standard. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should adopt the trustworthiness standard, reverse the decision of the 
Court of Appeals, and affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this lr day of March 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication). 
PER CURIAM. 
*1 Defendant asserts that because the State adduced 
only his confession as evidence of his guilt, the tnal 
Page 2 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 
charges The State acknowledges that Utah follows 
the corpus delicti rule Under that rule, a confession 
alone cannot support a conviction. In addition to the 
confession, the prosecution must adduce clear and 
convincing independent evidence that an injury 
occurred and that the injury resulted from criminal 
conduct See, eg, State v Allen, 839 P 2d 291, 301 
(Utah 1992), State v Johnson, 821 P 2d 1150, 1163 
(Utah 1990); State v Nguyen, 878 P 2d 1183, 1188 
(Utah Ct App 1994). The State acknowledges that the 
stipulated facts did not reflect the existence of 
inculpatory evidence independent of defendant's 
confession. 
After briefing was completed, the State filed a 
suggestion that the court certify the appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court in accordance with rule 43 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. This court declined to 
certify the appeal. 
In light of the foregoing, the tnal court's denial of 
defendant's motion to dismiss the charges is reversed, 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 
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